We examine the impact of patent infringement damages in an equilibrium oligopoly model of process innovation where the choice to infringe is endogenous and a¤ects market choices. Under the lost pro…ts measure of damages, we …nd that infringement always occurs in equilibrium with the infringing …rm making market choices that manipulate the resulting market pro…t of the patentholder. In equilibrium, infringement takes one of two forms: a "passive" form in which lost pro…ts of the patentholder are zero, and an "aggressive" form where they are strictly positive. Even though the patentee's pro…ts are protected with the lost pro…ts damage measure, innovation incentives are reduced relative to a regime where infringement is deterred.
Introduction
Patent law encourages innovation and the dissemination of knowledge by providing exclusivity in exchange for knowledge disclosures. The value of exclusivity derives from two penalties imposed on infringing parties: injunctions that stop subsequent use and damages in compensation for previous use. Because it is common for litigation to conclude after an infringer has been in the market for some time, expected damages play an important role in establishing incentives for innovation.
Since 1946 U.S. courts have largely adopted a compensatory approach to awarding damages to the patent holder as a result of patent infringement.
[Damages] have been de…ned by this Court as "compensation for the pecuniary loss he (the patentee) has su¤ered from the infringement, without regard to the question whether the defendant has gained or lost by his unlawful acts. The ideal damage award under this approach is the "lost pro…ts" of the patentee which are determined by calculating patentee pro…ts that would have occurred absent infringement. 2 In this paper we examine how this lost pro…ts measure of damages a¤ects competition, infringement, and the incentives for innovation in a market competition between the patentee and a potential infringer. This examination involves determining a reference level for lost pro…ts based on market competition that is consistent with equilibrium competitive choices. Evidentiary and information concerns are suppressed to permit a focus on the implications of the ideal lost pro…ts measure. We address two questions. First, when will damages based on lost market pro…ts deter infringement?
Second, if infringement is not deterred, how are innovation incentives impacted by the lost pro…ts approach?
We focus on a process innovation that allows the patentee to lower its costs relative to a noninnovating …rm. Given the patent, the non-innovating …rm chooses whether to imitate (and risk infringement). The market setting is a critical element in our analysis since the subsequent market outcomes are determined endogenously with behavior incorporating the consequences of the lost pro…ts damage measure. We assume a best case for the enforcement regime: whenever infringement is discovered, the court assesses accurately the associated damages and litigation does not involve transactions costs. 3 We then incorporate the equilibrium outcomes for infringement and market competition into a patent race to assess how the lost pro…t damage measure a¤ects innovation incentives.
Despite the long-standing interest in the question of patent damage measures, except for Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) there has been little equilibrium analysis of the e¤ects of those measures on market competition and innovation. Our paper complements the Schankerman and Scotchmer contribution by considering endogenous competition with both infringing and non-infringing options.
Schankerman and Scotchmer, in contrast, only consider competition through infringement. That perspective is a natural extension of their analysis of vertical licensing relationships-the primary concern of their paper-and is often appropriate for horizontal settings. But when a non-infringing option exists, the logic underlying Schankerman and Scotchmer's no-infringement result breaks down. We explain the di¤erence in results and contrast the damage measures in Section 7. 4 In the presence of even a weak noninfringing substitute, we …nd that a damage measure based exclusively on lost pro…ts of the patentee (as a result of infringement) always results in infringement in equilibrium. Infringement occurs because a non-innovating …rm always has the strategic option of "passive" infringement in which the patent is imitated but market choices mimic those in the noninfringement outcome (produce at the non-infringing quantity while taking pro…t gains only via lower costs). By de…nition, the patentholder su¤ers no lost pro…t and so the non-innovating …rm strictly prefers to infringe. In some cases, infringement takes a more aggressive form where the non-innovating …rm and patentee choose market positions that push lost pro…ts to a strictly positive level.
In equilibrium, under both forms of infringement the patentee receives the same net pro…ts as if no infringement had taken place. Thus, one might expect that the lost pro…ts measure preserves the 3 We do, however, allow for uncertainty in whether the infringement is detected. This allows for weak versus strong patent protection rights and, thus, a relative assessment of incentives in the benchmark case of perfect detection. 4 Our purpose is to illustrate how analyzing market structure illuminates the lost pro…ts legal damages. In Section 7.2 we analyze alternative damage approaches (reasonable royalties and disgorgement of infringer pro…ts) and …nd similar results. See also Kaplow and Shavell (1996) , Blair and Cotter (1998) incentive (reward) for innovative e¤orts. We …nd, however, that basing damages on lost pro…ts reduces the incentive to innovate relative to the benchmark case (no infringement). The explanation lies with the e¤ect of the damage measure on infringer payo¤s. In equilibrium, infringement always occurs and, at a minimum, a loser (non-innovating …rm) in a patent race will have a (valuable) "passive" infringement option. Thus, as ex ante innovation incentives are based on the pro…t di¤erences between being the patentee and the infringer, overall innovation incentives will be reduced.
We present the model in Section 2. Patentholder and imitator incentives are examined in Sections 3 and 4, respectively, and the equilibrium market outcomes and infringement choices are derived in Section 5. We then examine innovation incentives in a patent race in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of our results and an extension of the results to alternative damage rules.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
Our model consists of an innovator with a patent to a cost-reducing process innovation, …rm i, and a potential infringer (imitator), …rm j: Both …rms produce a homogeneous good but with potentially di¤erent costs. Market competition is concluded before infringement damages, if any, are awarded to the patentholder. The …rms are risk-neutral and maximize expected pro…ts. We focus on a strategic setting where quantities are chosen simultaneously. 5 Prior to innovation, the status quo has the two …rms competing with constant marginal costs of ¹ c in a market with linear demand 6 P (q) = ® ¡¯q:
Thus, the prior status quo involves the traditional Cournot equilibrium outcome. Now suppose that …rm i has obtained a patent for an innovation that allows it to produce at cost c, where c < ¹ c. Firm j has the option of remaining with the old technology and producing at cost ¹ c without any risk of infringement. Denote the option for j of no-imitation by N . When j chooses N , we have quantity competition between …rm i at cost c and …rm j at cost ¹ c; let ¼ N i and ¼ N j denote 5 Similar results obtain if quantity choice is sequential because the imitator still has the option of passive infringement.
One could also formulate the analysis in terms of price setting, di¤erentiated goods, and a product innovation. 6 We assume ® > 2¹ c so that both …rms are active (positive output). The assumption is su¢cient to avoid corner cases for outputs in equilibrium outcomes and is easily relaxed.
the resulting pro…t outcomes for the …rms. In the calculation of lost pro…ts, these are the reference pro…t levels that correspond to the hypothetical involving the market outcome in the event that no infringement had occurred.
Firm j also has the option, denoted by I, of imitating …rm i's patented innovation. However, this entails a risk that the court will …nd infringement. We assume that imitation allows …rm j to reduce costs relative to the prior technology and produce at cost s, where s < ¹ c. A special case involves perfect imitation (where c = s), but allowing for cost di¤erences (s 7 c) makes it possible to identify the di¤erent incentives of the two …rms and the results for the special case follow directly from the more general analysis. 7 If the court …nds infringement, the penalty requires that the infringer make a monetary payment to …rm i so that …rm i earns a net payo¤ equal to that which would have occurred had no infringement taken place. The penalty is related to market events as follows. Given a choice of I by …rm j, the …rms make quantity choices of q i and q j , respectively, for i and j. The resulting market price of P is from (1) and …rm i has a realized market payo¤ of (P ¡ c) q i . If this is less than ¼ N i , then …rm j must pay i the di¤erence. If not, then no damage penalty is assessed. Thus, the damage payment is given by D(q i ; q j )´Maxf¼ N i ¡ (P ¡ c) q i ; 0g. Our penalty assumption corresponds to a lost pro…ts calculation where licensing revenues are not included or would be zero.
We assume that the court …nds infringement with probability°when j chooses I. In practice, the lack of perfect enforcement arises for a number of reasons, including (i) …rm j may be able to circumvent the patent, (ii) the court may …nd the patent is invalid, and (iii) infringement is not detected. 8 The size of°e¤ectively indexes the strength of property rights for the patentholder and we can expect that small values of°will make I relatively more attractive for …rm j. Given a choice of I, the expected payo¤s for each …rm are given by
7 With s < c, the follower implements the innovation more e¤ectively than the innovator. A number of studies (e.g., Schnaars [1994] ) report that second-movers (e.g., non-patentholders who imitate) often achieve market dominance. 8 One can argue that the probability is related to the underlying extent of innovation and imitation, so that°depends on c and s. Also, penalties such as treble damages can be incorporated into°. As we note below, such relationships are easily incorporated into the analysis. See Lemley (2001) for a general discussion of the patent system. at quantity choices q i and q j , the market price of P = P (q i + q j ), and lost pro…ts damages of
We solve for a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which j chooses between N and I, and then the …rms simultaneously choose quantities for market competition. Finally, the court makes an infringement determination with payo¤s and damages determined via (2) and (3).
Market Incentives of the Patentholder
How should the patentholder (innovator), …rm i, choose quantity given that …rm j has chosen to imitate? We might expect this to depend on the strength of the patent, indexed by°, as well as the output expected from j. As a best-response problem, however, the choice of …rm i turns out to have a simple strategic structure. The payo¤ in (2) reveals that i is always led to choose a quantity that maximizes the realized market payo¤ of (P ¡ c) q i in response to any expected output choice by j.
Thus, the prospect of lost pro…ts has no direct impact on the market choice of the patentholder.
Refer to Figure 1 . There are two situations for …rm i with respect to …rm j. If j produces at a relatively high level, then the market payo¤ for …rm i is always below the reference pro…t for no infringement; this is the lower curve in Figure 1 . In this case, lost pro…ts are always positive and (2) reduces to maximizing (1 ¡°) times the market payo¤ and°does not matter for the optimizing choice.
In this case, the best response of …rm i is easily veri…ed to be q i = (® ¡ c ¡¯q j ) =(2¯) provided the interior term is positive (and zero when it is not). When infringement is proven, …rm i always gets ¼ N i so it is optimal to choose quantity to maximize pro…ts when infringement is not proven. Hence, the simple Cournot best response without regard to damages is optimal.
If j produces at a relatively low level, then we have the situation depicted with the upper curve in Figure 1 . Now, depending on i's response, lost pro…ts may be positive or zero (recall the absolute value restriction on payments from j to i). If i produces below q A or above q B , then lost pro…ts are strictly positive and, as before, (2) reduces to the (scaled) market payo¤. For these quantity cases, i's payo¤ is largest at q A and q B (both yield ¼ N i ), so output choices below q A or above q B are never a best response for i. For q i 2 (q A ; q B ), the market payo¤ exceeds ¼ N i and we have D = 0 by the de…nition of lost pro…ts damages. Now (2) is identically equal to the market payo¤ and, hence, an interior choice at point C in Figure 1 is optimal. As before, this reduces to q i = (® ¡ c ¡¯q j ) = (2¯) and, from a strategic point of view, …rm i does not respond directly to patent strength (°) or lost pro…ts. We formalize this argument as follows. The reference pro…t level of ¼ N i corresponds to the standard Cournot equilibrium outcome for …rm i with cost c and …rm j with cost ¹ c, and this is given by
Then, we calculate that the maximum value for market pro…t is above ¼ N i whenever q j is below q N j (as is the case with point C in Figure 1 ). However, as have seen, …rm i's best response is driven by the market payo¤ and it does not depend on whether lost pro…ts are positive or zero. Thus, we have Lemma 1 The best response of …rm i to q j by …rm j is given by
Note that the strength of patent rights (°) and the lost pro…t reference level have no direct e¤ect on the patentholder's market quantity choice. Instead, the patentholder's objective always reduces to maximizing the market payo¤ (pure or scaled). Consequently, i's market decision is only a¤ected indirectly via j's quantity choice.
Market Incentives of the Imitator
The strategic situation of the imitator (infringer) is considerably more complex because of the asymmetry in the payo¤ functions. Whether lost pro…ts are positive or zero, the patentholder's payo¤ always reduces to a multiple of the market payo¤. In contrast, the imitator's payo¤ involves his own market payo¤ as well as that of the patentholder whenever lost pro…ts are positive. Moreover, the market choices of both players determine when lost pro…ts are positive. This creates a number of subtle strategic e¤ects.
We begin by analyzing the imitator's market incentives when lost pro…ts are positive. Referring back to Figure 1 , consider the critical points q A and q B where the market payo¤ for i crosses the reference pro…t of ¼ N i . Fix j's output at zero for the moment and consider the value of [P (q i ) ¡ c] q i , which corresponds to a standard monopoly payo¤ function. This is maximized at the monopoly output
Thus, we can solve for the critical points q A and q B where i's payo¤ when
Consider the imitator's best-response problem if q i · q A or if q i¸qB . Then, as shown with the dashed line in Figure 2 , the market payo¤ for i is necessarily below ¼ N i for any choice of q j :
, lost pro…ts are necessarily positive for any (positive) output choice by the imitator.
In contrast, for q i 2 (q A ; q B ), there is a unique corresponding output level for j, denoted by Q j for the upper solid line in Figure 2 , at which lost pro…ts cease being zero and become positive. Solving, we …nd
We de…ne Q j to be zero outside of the interval (q A ; q B ). The basic properties of Q j follow directly from (7) and are summarized in
Figure 2: Imitator Output and Lost Pro…t
Consequently, in this case the imitator can determine through its output choice whether lost pro…ts are zero or, when positive, how large they are. With these preliminary observations in place, we now solve for the best response function of the imitator.
The …rst case is that of q i = 2 (q A ; q B ). Since D > 0 for all q j¸0 , we have from (3) that
, upon substituting for P . This is a strictly concave function in q j and, from the …rst-order condition, we …nd the unique optimal choice of
and ' j (q i )´0 for larger q i . Thus, as long as the patentholder's output does not force j from the market, the impact of the lost pro…t penalty depends on the size of°. As°rises and property rights become more secure, the imitator becomes more "timid" and reduces output. When property rights vanish, at°= 0, ' j (q i ) reduces to the standard Cournot best response function.
The second case arises when q i 2 (q A ; q B ). A di¢culty lies with determining whether j will …nd it pro…table to produce aggressively, thereby inducing a positive lost pro…ts penalty, or keep output low, thereby holding lost pro…ts to zero. As Figure 2 suggests, the output level of Q j (q i ) is critical for this choice. Formally, we have 
, then the best response of j is Q j (q i ), and D = 0 at (q i ; q j ); (iii) if
, and D > 0 at (q i ; q j ).
Equilibrium Market Outcomes and Infringement
We now characterize the market equilibrium choices for output, given that j has chosen to imitate and risk infringement. Then we examine j's equilibrium infringement choice.
Lost pro…ts are strictly positive in equilibrium.
In this case, the lost pro…t penalty is not su¢cient to deter the imitator from driving the patentholder's market pro…t below the no-infringement reference level. This is an "aggressive" form of infringement. Solving the equations
The imitator produces a large quantity and the patentholder responds by reducing output (relative to the no-infringement outcome of N ). On balance, the patentholder's market payo¤ falls below the reference level and lost pro…ts are strictly positive.
Lost pro…ts are zero in equilibrium.
In this case, we have a "passive" form of infringement. In fact, the patentholder produces as if no infringement occurred. The imitator, however, is infringing and producing at cost s rather than cost ¹ c. The choice of output by the imitator is speci…cally set at the level which induces i to respond at the . In other words, j produces at its own reference level for no infringement, namely, q N j . By doing so, no lost pro…ts are generated. Instead, the imitator takes the gain from infringing completely in the form of reduced production costs for output q N j . Of course, the patentholder has a payo¤ of ¼ N i in equilibrium for both cases. Figure 3 illustrates the two cases for the equilibrium outcome. When ' j is large, as with the upper solid line, the equilibrium is at point A, where ' j and Á i intersect. When it is small, the equilibrium is always at point B, where the level of lost pro…ts is at zero.
An important question concerns which of these two cases applies in relation to the underlying structural parameters of the model: property rights (°), the level of innovation (c) and the e¢cacy of imitation (s). From Propositions 1 and 2, we need only determine when ' j ¡ q N i ¢ ? q N j occurs relative to the parameters. Substituting and simplifying, a dividing line between passive and aggressive infringement is determined by the cost levels c (for i) and s (for j): The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the imitator will choose to infringe in equilibrium. Whenever lost pro…ts are zero in equilibrium, imitation is always pro…table. This is because j pursues the passive infringement strategy to produce the same output and receive the same market price as with no imitation, but production costs are lower and there is no lost pro…t penalty.
Infringement is also pro…table when lost pro…ts are positive in equilibrium. Lost pro…ts are positive in equilibrium when j increases quantity above the passive infringement quantity. Since j can always generate pro…t improvement using passive infringement, aggressive infringement will only be used if it provides yet greater rents. Therefore, no matter what the strength of property rights, the lost pro…ts damage criterion will necessarily trigger infringement. Formally, we have Proposition 4 The imitator earns strictly greater pro…ts from I than from N . Thus, in equilibrium, the imitator always chooses to infringe.
Innovation Incentives
An objective of the patent system and of intellectual property rights regimes more generally is to encourage innovation. At the same time welfare is a¤ected by market allocation given innovation.
Determining the optimal damage measure thus depends on the e¤ect of the measure on both dynamic and static competition. 10 Because there is little consensus on the right way to model innovation, we address a more modest question: how do our results for the lost pro…t damage measure relate to innovation incentives? 11 A natural benchmark is to consider innovation incentives relative to a setting in which infringement is completely deterred and the patentholder earns the reference payo¤ of ¼ N i . In the equilibrium under lost pro…ts damages, we always have infringement by the imitator but, signi…cantly, whether infringement is passive or aggressive, the patentholder continues to earn an equilibrium payo¤ of ¼ N i . With the same reward to a patent, it is tempting to conclude that innovation incentives are not distorted relative to the benchmark. This intuition, however, is misleading. While the reward to innovating is the same, the reward to not innovating is di¤erent. Speci…cally, the incentive to invest in R&D will be a¤ected by the prospect of the reward to "failure," namely, the option to imitate and infringe on a patented innovation. In equilibrium, this option always has positive value (Proposition 4). Thus, relative to the benchmark of no infringement, the lost pro…ts damage criterion creates a free-rider incentive. Failure has its reward too.
Innovation incentives can be explored in a variety of R&D contexts. Let us examine the incentive to innovate in a standard "memoryless" (Poisson) patent race in continuous time with two ex-ante symmetric …rms, k = 1; 2, and interest rate r (our treatment is a variation on Reinganum [1983] ).
Each …rm invests at the expenditure rate x k and succeeds at innovation with instantaneous probability h (x k ); the Appendix develops further the technical requirements. In the absence of a success by either …rm, each earns the status quo ‡ow pro…t of ¹ ¼´(® ¡ ¹ c) 2 = (9¯). The …rst to achieve success, denoted by …rm i, patents the innovation, assumes the role of the patentholder and earns a payo¤ with present discounted value of V i . The other …rm becomes the imitator, denoted by …rm j, and receives a discounted payo¤ of V j . In the benchmark case, we have
The question of innovation incentives can be examined by computing the comparative static of equilibrium R&D with respect to V j .
The intertemporal payo¤ to R&D of x 1 when the rival is at x 2 is given by
as follows from standard reasoning in patent-race models. It is straightforward to show that a unique equilibrium exists and is symmetric. The comparative static result is then
Proposition 5
The equilibrium level of R&D in the patent race is decreasing in V j , the payo¤ to the imitator.
To interpret Proposition 5, note that lost pro…t damages involve an increase in V j relative to the benchmark setting of no infringement. By increasing the payo¤ of the …rm that fails to patent, R&D incentives are reduced in the patent race and both …rms invest less in R&D. 12 To map the payo¤s of V i and V j into the lost pro…ts model, the simplest interpretation is that the duration of the infringement …ght e¤ectively runs for the market life of the innovation. Then, …rm i continues to earn V i = ¼ N i =r while …rm j earns
Proposition 5 is speci…c to a patent race or tournament structure. Consider instead a pure nontournament structure in which only one …rm can invest in patentable cost-reducing R&D. Noting that the payo¤ ¼ N i in (4) rises as costs fall, it is clear that the investment incentives of the …rm under lost pro…ts damages and under full deterrence of infringement are the same. An interesting extension would be to explore R&D incentives in a setting involving both tournament and non-tournament dimensions.
Discussion

The Lost Pro…ts Reference Level and Licensing
In this paper we illustrate how damages based on lost pro…ts in the market lead to infringement.
The critical element provided by an explicit market structure is that an infringer has the (valuable) strategic option of choosing market actions that are designed to manipulate the resulting equilibrium level of lost market pro…ts. This approach best captures situations in which the innovator and imitator are horizontal competitors and for antitrust reasons are therefore likely to have signi…cantly limited or completely foreclosed licensing alternatives.
If licensing were feasible and easily negotiated, arguably the appropriate lost pro…ts measure would be the greater of the innovator's market pro…ts from exclusive use and market pro…ts plus license revenues from sharing the patent with the imitator. 14 With respect to the latter, Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) point out that appropriate license revenues cannot be pinned down as they depend 1 3 One can extend this in a number of ways. For instance, imagine that the infringement suit is resolved over a period of time T during which the …rms earn payo¤s of ¼ on legal damages which, in turn, depend on licensing revenues. From this perspective our measure might appear to be at the low end of the feasible interval of lost pro…ts since we explicitly exclude possible licensing revenues. But this measure can be interpreted as consisting of the expected market pro…t from sharing plus an implicit license. Our reference level is exclusive-use pro…ts under airtight property rights which is larger than exclusive-use pro…ts under weaker property rights. The di¤erence between the two pro…t levels can then be viewed as a pro…t from an implicit license. For example, when°, the parameter in our model that captures the strength of property rights, is considerably below one, our reference pro…t, ¼ N i ; exceeds the no-license expected pro…t level and includes a healthy license fee.
By contrast, the upper end of lost pro…t reference level includes a sharing of revenues from a license based on both e¢cient production and the coordination of output. 15 This reference level is employed by Schankerman and Scotchmer to explore vertical relationships. When their main model is adapted to horizontal relationships, they …nd that imitators never infringe (o¤-the-equilibrium path) a result directly opposite to what we …nd. What accounts for this di¤erence?
The di¤erence in reference levels-including increased gains to licensing-is not the explanation: it is easy to construct an example using the S-S reference level in which infringement will occur when an imitator is more e¤ective at implementing the innovation than the innovator (s < c). Rather, the di¤erence results because the S-S model and our model analyze di¤erent cases. The S-S model does not allow for noninfringing competition by the imitator (q N j´0 in our setting), e¤ectively making the imitator's no-infringement pro…t and quantity equal to zero. 16 Our model allows for noninfringing competition so that some imitator production is the fallback. Thus, the innovator's "but for" infringement reference level is based on pro…ts obtained through an asymmetric duopoly competition not through "monopoly" use and, critically, the imitator can always passively infringe and increase its own pro…ts without altering the innovator's no-infringement duopoly pro…t. Passive 1 5 For example, suppose the patent involved a trivial cost reduction in a setting with horizontal competitors. Then the whole of the "but for" pro…t increase comes from a reduction of competition through a coordinated output reduction.
It is just this possibility that the antitrust laws on licenses between competitors circumscribe. infringement is ruled out by assumption in S-S. 17 Both our model and the S-S model focus on the implications of lost pro…t damage rules under ideal conditions where the but for level of pro…t is known. In practice, evidentiary considerations and murkiness in the appropriate application of economics to the creation of a hypothetical benchmark have led courts to be ‡exible regarding patent damage awards. 18 Historically, lost pro…ts have been awarded without allowing for the price reducing e¤ects of competition from an infringer. A number of recent decisions, however, have explicitly incorporated this notion of "price erosion" in lost pro…t damages calculations. 19 Note also that courts calculating lost pro…t damages typically focus on an exclusive-use reference pro…t and not on a more expanded reference that includes licensing.
Alternative Damage Measures: Reasonable Royalties and Disgorgement
Under conditions where the but for hypothetical is inherently di¢cult to establish, use of lost pro…ts has been discouraged by the courts in favor of reasonable royalties in which the patent-holder is awarded a royalty on the sales of the infringing product. 20 1 7 S-S's no infringement result adapted to our setting appears to require the assumption that joint infringement pro…ts (before damage payments) under competition are less than the no-infringement pro…ts of the innovator and the imitator.
Under passive infringement and a cost-reducing technology, this assumption will not hold. See our Propositions 1 and 2. 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) laid out four conditions necessary for damages to be awarded based on lost pro…ts. When these conditions are not met courts typically use a royalties-based approach to assessing damages. In recent years, however, Our basic infringement results are robust to a version of reasonable royalty damages in which the damages consist of some fraction of the cost savings attributable to using the patented innovation times the number of infringing units. 21 Under this reasonable royalty rule, damages are a fraction ½ of the cost savings times the quantity of infringing units or D R = ½( _ c ¡ s)q j : If j chooses to infringe, then the payo¤s to i and j at quantities q i and q j , respectively, are given by
Since q i has no direct impact on the damage payment, …rm i always chooses a quantity that maximizes the realized market payo¤. Thus, the patentholder's best response is again given by
, as in Lemma 1. For the imitator, observe that D R implies that j's payo¤ coincides with that of a Cournot duopolist who has a cost ofĉ´(1 ¡°½)s +°½¹ c < ¹ c. Thus, j's best response follows q j = (® ¡ĉ ¡¯q i )=(2¯). The economic intuition for the resulting outcome is then clear. Relative to the N outcome with i at cost c and j at cost ¹ c, the only di¤erence under R is that there is an outward shift in the best response of the imitator due toĉ < ¹ c. As a result, j will increase quantity while i reduces quantity in the resulting equilibrium. Solving the best response conditions simultaneously, it is straightforward to verify that
For pro…ts, we have
and it is always optimal for the imitator to infringe. Essentially, infringement provides an option to operate with lower costs and, in equilibrium, the reasonable-royalty damage payment only partially o¤sets the resulting cost gains at the resulting market price and quantities. The resulting pro…t impact on the patentholder, however, is more subtle. While the market price and q R i both decline relative to N , implying a decline in market revenue, the damage payment enters as an o¤setting positive term. When°½ is su¢ciently small, j is su¢ciently aggressive that we have
In this case, innovation incentives are necessarily reduced since the reward to innovation now falls while, as before, the reward to failure rises.
For larger°½, however, the reduced innovation incentive is partially mitigated since ¦ R i (q R i ; q R j ) > ¼ N i . The reasonable royalty fallback directly impacts the problem posed by an infringer's strategic response to damages based on pure market lost pro…ts discussed above. If the royalties fallback was developed primarily to make damage calculation simpler, it clearly has a salutary e¤ect in partially patching a loophole left by a pure market lost pro…ts doctrine. Since reasonable royalties typically leave an infringer with positive incremental pro…ts, our notion of passive infringement extends to this situation with the reinterpretation that instead of free infringement, the passive infringer is choosing a favorable (implicit) licensing deal over aggressive infringement with its lost pro…t potential damages.
Our model can also be adapted to an alternative approach based on disgorgement of infringer pro…ts (see, e.g., the discussion in Blair and Cotter [1998] ). 
We see that the imitator payo¤ now reduces to a scale multiple of the market payo¤. Thus, the best response of the imitator follows Á j (for cost s) in complete analogy to the patentholder's behavior under lost pro…ts. For the patentholder, however, an increase in q i not only impacts the market payo¤ (in the standard way) but also reduces the market price and, hence, the margin on disgorgement damages from j. Because of this added e¤ect, the patentholder becomes more timid and the best response shifts inward relative to that under N . Thus, relative to N , we …nd that the imitator increases output while the patentholder reduces output. Further, the imitator always …nds infringement to be pro…table, as
As with reasonable royalties, however, the pro…t impact on the patentholder depends inversely on the strength of property rights, with similar implications for innovation incentives.
The analysis of these alternative damage measures illustrates that infringement is induced when a damage rule shifts the imitator's best response function towards higher output, while the innovator's best response function remains una¤ected or shifts towards lower output. These features characterize the lost pro…ts, reasonable royalties, and disgorgement damage rules that we have examined.
Incomplete Information
An important element in our analysis is the attractive strategic option for the infringer to avoid lost pro…ts damages by maintaining its pre-patent quantity level. This option makes infringement a dominant strategy and is the linchpin for our analysis. How robust is the passive infringement option to incomplete information?
In practice, costs are likely to be a source of private information. The problem is that the infringer will not know what quantity would obtain given the patent and no infringement until it has some market experience competing against the patentee. Once it has this information, the passive infringement option can be used without direct knowledge of a rival's costs because only knowledge of previous period quantity (with the patentee producing using the innovation and the infringer without that innovation) is needed. Private costs could, however, a¤ect the boundary of the parameter region in which the passive infringement strategy is employed. This would occur through its e¤ect on market choices, directly in market competition and indirectly in terms of the infringement damages that are anticipated.
Weak Property Rights
The reference levels used for damages assessment are further complicated as one moves away from a binary view of infringement to a view in which …rms choose from a continuum of product or process choices that have some level of associated infringement risk. Incorporation of weak property rights 2 3 This is readily veri…ed from the solutions to the best response conditions:
in our model provides some insight into this more complex problem. Proposition 3 shows that the strength of property rights impacts the attractiveness of passive versus aggressive infringement in a natural way. An interesting problem that we did not address is whether passive infringement endogenously a¤ects a patent holder's awareness of infringement since sales levels will not suggest infringement. 24 Also, with weak property rights, the innovator has a stronger incentive to choose secrecy over patenting in order to deny a competitor useful cost-reducing knowledge. 25 In fact, from a "weak property rights" perspective, so-called infringement is not unambiguously bad since it is not at all obvious that the patent holder should have exclusivity with respect to the patented technology.
In this case overdeterrence of infringing innovation becomes a more serious concern.
In brief summary, the inherent complexity of market interactions when intertwined with legal sanctions does not mean that one should necessarily throw up one's hands and declare a reasonable royalty. It should, however, force an equilibrium analysis of the underlying structure of the competitive interaction.
The proofs for Lemmas 1 and 2 and for Proposition 3 are straightforward and therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 3: For q i 2 (q A ; q B ), the payo¤ to j is given by
This is a strictly concave objective in q j but it has a kink at q j = Q j (q i ). Calculating, we …nd
By continuity and strict concavity, we know a unique solution exists. Since @¦ j =@q j¯q j =0 = ® ¡ s ¡¯q i · 0 , q i¸( ® ¡ s) =¯, we see that q j = 0 is the solution for this case. Otherwise, in cases (i) and (iii), we see that …rst-order condition holds with equality, @¦ j =@q j = 0, at the speci…ed q j values. In case (ii), only the kink value of q j = Q j (q i ) satis…es the …rst-order condition.¥
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2:
We establish Propositions 1 and 2 via a sequence of claims.
First, we claim that for any cost pair (c; s) and any°2 (0; 1), there is no equilibrium in which j chooses to produce on Á j . Recall from Lemma 3 (i) that Á j is potentially a best response for j when q i 2 (q A ; q B ). We know from Lemma 1 that the best response for i is always on Á i . Now, recall the reference outcome N , speci…ed in (4) and (5) . In N , i follows the best response Á i while j follows the best response of Á N j´m ax f0; (® ¡ 2¹ c ¡¯q i ) =(2¯)g; the equilibrium outcome for N has i producing q N i , and this output level also satis…es q N i = argmax Q j (q i ). Noting that Á j > Á N j , because s < ¹ c, we see that the intersection of Á i and Á j occurs at a quantityq i that is strictly below q N i ; the corresponding quantityq j for j is strictly above Q j (q i ). But this implies lost pro…ts are positive at (q i ;q j ) and this implies that Á j (q i ) is not the best response choice for j. Formally, we haveq i < q 
where the …nal two steps follow from simplifying and observing that s < ¹ c. Thus, Lemma 3 (i) cannot apply atq i .
Next, we claim there is no equilibrium in which q i > q N i . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that such an equilibrium does exist. Denote it by (q i ;q j ). Then j must be at a best response toq i and this must be in the set © Q j (q i ) ; Á j (q i ) ; ' j (q i ) ª , by Lemma 3. We can rule out anyq i¸( ® ¡ c) = (2¯) since the best response of i to any q j is always below this level (Lemma 1). Then, in this equilibrium, we must have (® ¡ c) = (2¯)¸q i > q N i . We can now rule out Q j as a best response for j: Á i , the best response for i intersects Q j only one time and this occurs at q N i . We can rule out Á j for j from the …rst claim above. This leaves only ' j . Now, since Á i lies strictly below
we see thatq j = Á ¡1 i (q i ) < Q j (q i ) and D = 0 holds. By Lemma 3, j is not at a best response with ' j when D = 0. This establishes the second claim.
We now prove Proposition 1. First, note that j will not play Q j in any equilibrium:
Thus, consider which case of Lemma 3 applies:
Thus, Lemma 3 (iii) applies at
; therefore, Lemma 3 (iii) applies over this entire interval and j plays ' j as a best response.
Thus, we have shown that i must play Á i , j must play ' j , and any equilibrium must have q i · q N i . It is then routine algebra to solve for the (unique) intersection, yielding q ¢ and, by Proposition 2, the equilibrium involves the market quantities from the reference outcome N , we have equilibrium pro…ts for j of
and a choice of I by j is optimal. The second case is that of
¢ where, by Proposition 1, the equilibrium is at (q ¤ i ; q ¤ j ). We must show that ¦ ¤ j = ¦ j (q ¤ j ; q where the …rst step follows from the envelope theorem (j is at a best response) and the second by direct calculation. Note that
which follows from the right-hand-side being strictly decreasing in°and equaling zero at°= 1.
Hence, by convexity,
Thus, ¦ j ¡ ' j (x) ; x ¢ is strictly decreasing for x 2 £ q ¤ i ; q N i ¤ and we have shown j's pro…t at A exceeds that at C. Combining the comparison for A, B and C, we are done.¥
Proof of Proposition 5:
Assume that h satis…es h 0 > 0, h 00 < 0, h(0) = 0 = lim x!1 h 0 (x), and that h 0 (0) is su¢ciently large to rule out an R&D level of zero. Assume that V i > ¹ ¼=r > V j and that V i + V j > 2¹ ¼=r; these assumptions are satis…ed for the N benchmark. Then, the best response for …rm 1 (symmetrically for 2) to x 2 is unique, positive, and satis…es the …rst-order condition: Under the added assumption on h (see Tirole [1988, p. 416] ) that
the equilibrium is unique. It is then straightforward to calculate that dx 
